12844 (Supplement to Notice of Judgment 11784). Misbranding of Crab 
Orchard concentrated mineral water. Idie C. Goodwin and "L. H. 
Goodwin &, Co. v. United States of America. Judgment of the 
lower court in favor of the Government affirmed, (P. & D. No. 
15395.   I. S. No. 903-t.    S. No. C-3245.)
On November 3, 1924, the case involving the shipment of 22 bottles of Crab 
Orchard concentrated mineral water by L. H. Goodwin & Co., from Crab 
Orchard, Ky., to Cincinnati, Ohio, in which case verdict and judgment were 
entered for the Government in the District Court for the Southern District 
of Ohio on November 28, 1922, came before the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit on appeal by the claimant, Idie C. Goodwin, for and on be- 
half of L. H. Goodwin & Co., and the judgment of the District Court was 
affirmed, as will appear from the attached opinion of the court (Donahue, 
?. J.) :
" The food and drugs act of 1906 and the amendments of 1912 do not confer 
and do not purport to confer admiralty jurisdiction upon the United States 
District Courts, in proceedings to condemn property seized under the provi- 
sions of that act and amendments thereto. The provision that a libel shall 
be filed and the proceedings shall conform as near as may be to the proceed- 
ings in admiralty, relate only to procedure and not to jurisdiction. (443 Cans 
of Frozen Egg Product v. U. S., 226 U. S. 172, and cases there cited.)
" This prosecution was based solely on the amendment of 1912 to section 8. 
The libel quoted from the label a long list of ailments for which the water 
was said to be beneficial with ' healing powers' and a ' reliable remedy.' 
It then denied that the water 'is capable of producing the therapeutic effects 
claimed in the statements upon and in said cartons as hereinbefore set forth.'
" This does not fail to state a case under the statute, and did not make the 
Jibel subject to demurrer or motion to quash. It would be sustained by evi- 
dence sufficiently showing the false and fraudulent character of any one of 
the various claims recited. If defendant needed a better specification of the 
particulars upon which the Government would rely, if it did not rely upon all 
the statements, a motion for a bill of particulars would doubtless have been 
granted or an amendment of the libel permitted.
" The record in this case does not present the question whether mineral 
spring water as it comes from the earth is or is not a drug, for the reason 
that the Crab Orchard concentrated mineral water is not transported and 
marketed in its original condition. While it appears that the constituent 
?drug elements are not completely extracted therefrom and transported and 
sold without the admixture of other elements, nevertheless the processes of 
?separation are carried to such an extent that the water can no longer be 
used as a beverage, but only in small quantities or doses, as a medicine. For 
this reason Crab Orchard concentrated mineral water can not be classified as 
'food' but, on the contrary, comes fairly within the meaning of 'drug^ as 
used in the Pure Food Act and amendments thereto.
" Upon the trial of the issue of fact joined by the libel, charging the mis- 
branding of mineral water, and the answer of the intervenor, expert evidence 
may be properly admitted. If it appears from the testimony of a witness 
upon preliminary examination that he is learned in the science of chemistry 
?or has been regularly and legally admitted to the practice of medicine, that 
he has knowledge of the drug elements contained in the art'cle transported 
in interstate commerce and their efficacy or lack of efficacy as curative agents, 
used either separately or in combination in the treatment of the diseases 
specified on the label, his opinion on that subject is competent evidence, re- 
gardless of whether he has had actual experience or observation of the effect 
of the use of such drugs in the exact form in which they are transported in 
interstate commerce.   The weight of his evidence is a question for the jury.
" This court has no authority to determine the weight of the evidence or re- 
verse the judgment for the reason that the verdict is against the weight of 
the evidence where the verdict of the jury is sustained by substantial evi- 
dence. (R. S. 3011 (Comp. Stat. Sec. 1672), Bullock v. U. S., 289 Fed. 29-32; 
Atlantic Ice & Coal Co. v. Van, 276 Fed. 646.)
" The Government having charged misbranding in general terms and no mo- 
tion being made to require it to file a bill of particulars, the general verdict 
must be sustained if there is substantial evidence that any one of the state- 
ments made on the label is false or fraudulent, but the verdict and judgment 
relates to and affects oniy the particular label on the bottles seized in inter- 
state commerce.    This general verdict is sustained by substantial evidence.
" For the reasons stated, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed."
W. M. JAKDINE, Secretary of Agriculture.