30585. Special purpose foods. Suits for declaratory judgment and injunction. American Dietaids Co., Inc., Yonkers, New York, a manufacturer of special purpose foods, filed complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunction, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and against Edward Warner and Carl E. Lorentzson, inspectors of the Food and Drug Administration. The facts as alleged in the complaints are contained in the court opinions set forth below. DISPOSITION : The defendants filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint filed on or about August 20, 1962, and on November 5, 1962, the court handed down the following opinion and order relating to the dismissal of the complaint: MCGOHET, District Judge: Memorandum and Order "The defendants move under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for dismissal of the complaint on the grounds (1) that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and (2) that in the absence of such jurisdic- tion over the Secretary, there is a failure to join an indispensable party. "Service was attempted to be made upon the Secretary by delivery of copies of the summons and complaint to the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and, by registered mail, to the United States Attorney General in Washington, D.C, and by delivery of another copy of the summons and complaint by a United States Marshal to an officer allegedly authorized to accept service for the Secretary in Washington, D.C. This attempted per- sonal service upon the Secretary was made on August 24, 1962, before the recent amendment of 28 U.S.C. section 1391. Pub. L. No. 748, 87th Cong., 2d Jess. § 2 (Oct. 5, 1962). Since at the time there was no authorization for such service of the process of this Court outside the territorial limits of the State of New York, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f), the attempted service in Washington, D.C. was without effect.1 The complaint must therefore be dismissed as against the Secretary. "The complaint alleges that on or about August 9, 1962, the defendants Warner and Lorentzson, Inspectors of the Food and Drug Administration, gained entry to the plaintiff's business premises under color of authority for the purpose of making a factory inspection pursuant to section 704(a) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. section 374(a) ; that they brought into the premises on that occasion a concealed tape recording device with- out the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff; that the defendants were thus able to 'record statements and conversations of persons in plaintiff's business premises including agents, employees, and representatives of the plaintiff'; that a representative of the plaintiff became aware of the presence and use of the device and demanded that the tape be turned over to the plaintiff, which demand was refused; and that 'upon information and belief the aforesaid acts were committed 'pursuant to and upon the direction of Secretary Clea- red. The complaint asks for a declaration that the acts of the defendants were unauthorized by the statute and illegal under the Fourth Amendment; for an injunction restraining 'the defendants and each of them, their servants, agents, employees and representatives' from further engaging in such acts, and for a further injunction 'directing defendants to turn over to plaintiff the 1 Stewart v. United States, 5 Cir., 242 F. 2d 49; Heiser Ready Mix Co. v. Fenton. 7 Circ 26,5 F. 2d 277. tapes used in the recording device as hereinabove complained of, together with any copies, reproductions, memoranda, notes or other records made from such tapes.' "It seems clear that a decree granting the relief sought would require some higher official than Warner or Lorentzson 'to take action, either by exercising directly a power lodged in him or by having a subordinate exercise it for him.' Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 493. Certainly the most important relief sought, an order directing that the tapes be turned over to the plaintiff, could only be obtained by a decree binding an official having present custody or authority over the tapes. Whether the indispensable superior officer is the Secretary himself or some lesser, local official need not be decided now, for it is clear that, in any case, no such official is presently before this Court. "Accordingly, the complaint will be dismissed, but with leave to file a new complaint naming the official or officials against whom the relief desired, if granted, may be effectively decreed. "So Ordered." As a result of the foregoing opinion a new complaint was filed on or about November 15, 1962, as indicated above. The defendants thereafter filed a mo- tion for dismissal and on 3-22-63, the court granted such motion and handed down the following opinion (215 F. Supp. 252) : DAWSON, District Judge: "This is a motion by defendants, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order dismissing the complaint. "The action purports to be one for declaratory judgment pursuant to Section 1337, Title 28, U.S.C, declaring that certain acts of the defendants are un- authorized by law and in violation of the provisions of Section 704(a) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and for a declaration that they consti- tute an interference with plaintiff's rights against illegal search and seizure. The complaint also asks for an injunction. "The acts complained of may be summarized as follows: "The defendants Warner and Lorentzson are inspectors of the Federal Food and Drug Administration of the Department of Health, Education and Wel- fare. On or about August 9, 1962, these defendants presented to the plaintiff a notice of inspection to inspect the plant of plaintiff and were granted access to the premises. It is alleged in the complaint that they had a tape recording device with them, and 'That said defendants WARNER and LORENTZSON, did thereupon carry said hidden and. concealed tape recording device into and through plaintiff's business premises, wherein it was able to and did pick up and record statements and conversations of persons in plaintiff's business premises including agents, employees, and representatives of the plaintiff.' "There is no indication that any proceeding, criminal or otherwise, is pend- ing or that respondents are seeking to use or intending to use the tape recording referred to in the complaint. "It may be pointed out that the use of such hidden tape recording device is not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) ; United States v. Kaoot, 295 F. 2d 848 (2d Cir. 1961) cert, denied 369 U.S. 803 (1962). "However, a more important issue is presented at the threshold. The facts alleged in the complaint do not present an issue for which declaratory judg- ment is an appropriate remedy. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that something done in the past was illegal. It does not contend that any present actual controversy exists. In order to get jurisdiction under the declaratory judg- ment statute it must be shown that the case involves what the statute calls an 'actual controversy.' Section 2201, Title 28, U.S.C. An actual controversy is one appropriate for legal determination. It must be definite and concrete. It must relate to the relations of parties having adverse interests. It differs from one that is academic or moot. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). "Here there is no adversary proceeding seeking a determination of the legal rights of parties to a presently existing or contemplated controversy. Plaintiff is saying no more than that a wrong has been done in the past and it wants a declaration that these past acts constitute a wrong. This is not the function of an action for declaratory judgment. If a wrong has been done in the past plaintiff can sue to remedy that wrong. If plaintiff is afraid that the tape recording will be used in the future in a criminal proceeding not yet instituted, it has an adequate remedy at the time of the institution of suit toy a motion to suppress. "If plaintiff is concerned lest similar acts take place in the future, the com- plaint is still not adequate. Circumstances may well be different in the future. Each such incident must be considered in the light of the facts of the incident. It is not proper to say that because a wrong was done plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that he should not be wronged in the future. Borchard, Declara- tory Judgment (2d Ed.) p. 84. "The action is not one which is appropriate for declaratory judgment. The motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. So ordered." The case was appealed by American Dietaids Co., Inc.,