The article was alleged to be adulterated in that it consisted of a filthy animal substance.

On September 13, 1938, no claimant having appeared, judgment of condemna-

tion was entered and the product was ordered destroyed.

HARRY L. BROWN, Acting Secretary of Agriculture.

29388. Adulteration of candy. U. S. v. 14 Boxes of Candy. Default decree of condemnation and destruction. (F. & D. No. 43021. Sample No. 23867-D.)

This product was infested with insects and mites.

On or about July 7, 1938, the United States attorney for the Southern District of Texas, acting upon a report by the Secretary of Agriculture, filed in the district court a libel praying seizure and condemnation of 14 boxes of candy at Houston, Tex.; alleging that the article had been shipped in interstate commerce on or about August 17, 1937, by Pravata Candy Co. from New Orleans, La.; and charging adulteration in violation of the Food and Drugs Act. The article was labeled in part: "Mfg. by Pravata Candy Co., New Orleans, La."

It was alleged to be adulterated in that it consisted wholly or in part of a

filthy vegetable substance.

On September 10, 1938, no claimant having appeared, judgment of condemnation was entered and the product was ordered destroyed.

HARRY L. Brown, Acting Secretary of Agriculture.

29389. Adulteration of candy. U. S. v. 15 Boxes of Candy (and 1 similar seizure action). Default decrees of condemnation and destruction. (F. & D. Nos. 42968, 43116. Sample Nos. 16250-D, 23902-D.)

Samples of these products were found to contain mites and insect larvae and

fragments.

On or about June 23 and July 25, 1938, the United States attorney for the Southern District of Texas, acting upon reports by the Secretary of Agriculture, filed in the district court libels praying seizure and condemnation of 15 boxes of candy and 13 cartons of mint lumps at Houston, Tex.; alleging that the articles had been shipped in part on or about March 11, 1938, and in part on or about June 27, 1938, by the Joan Candy Co. from New Orleans, La.; and charging adulteration in violation of the Food and Drugs Act. One lot was labeled in part: "Joan Candy Co. New Orleans, La."

The articles were alleged to be adulterated in that they consisted wholly or

in part of filthy vegetable substances.

On September 2 and 9, 1938, no claimant having appeared, judgments of condemnation were entered and the products were ordered destroyed.

HARRY L. BROWN, Acting Secretary of Agriculture.

29390. Adulteration of apple butter. U. S. v. 30 Cases of Apple Butter. Default decree of condemnation and destruction. (F. & D. No. 42360. Sample No. 13001-D.)

This product contained insect fragments, mites, and rodent hairs.

On May 10, 1938, the United States attorney for the District of New Jersey, acting upon a report by the Secretary of Agriculture, filed in the district court a libel praying seizure and condemnation of 30 cases of apple butter at Paterson, N. J.; alleging that the article had been shipped in interstate commerce on or about October 18, 1937, by Adams Apple Products Corporation from Aspers, Pa.; and charging adulteration in violation of the Food and Drugs Act. The article was labeled in part: "Apple Butter \* \* Adams Apple Products Corporation Aspers, \* \* \* Pennsylvania."

It was alleged to be adulterated in that it consisted in whole or in part of a

filthy vegetable substance.

On September 16, 1938, no claimant having appeared, judgment of condemnation was entered and the product was ordered destroyed.

HARRY L. Brown, Acting Secretary of Agriculture.

29391. Adulteration of candy. U. S. v. 15 Cartons and 16 Cartons of Candy. Default decrees of condemnation and destruction. (F. & D. Nos. 43064, 43182. Sample Nos. 23871–D, 23910–D.)

Samples of this product were found to be moldy and insect-infested.

On or about July 14 and August 3, 1938, the United States attorney for the Southern District of Texas, acting upon reports by the Secretary of Agriculture, filed in the district court libels praying seizure and condemnation of 31 cartons of candy at Houston, Tex.; alleging that the articles had been shipped in interstate commerce in part on or about October 20 and in part on or about

November 24, 1937, by Rockwood & Co. from Brooklyn, N. Y.; and charging adulteration in violation of the Food and Drugs Act. The article was labeled in part: "Rockwood & Co., Brooklyn, N. Y."

It was alleged to be adulterated in that it consisted wholly or in part of a

filthy vegetable substance.

On September 6 and 8, 1938, no claimant having appeared, judgments of condemnation were entered and the product was ordered destroyed.

HARRY L. BROWN, Acting Secretary of Agriculture.

29392. Alleged adulteration and misbranding of potatoes. U. S. v. 420 Sacks of Potatoes. Tried to the court. Judgment for claimant. Libel dismissed and product ordered released. (F. & D. No. 42921. Sample No. 33644-D.)

On June 13, 1938, the United States attorney for the District of Maryland, acting upon a report by the Secretary of Agriculture, filed in the district court a libel praying seizure and condemnation of 420 sacks of potatoes at Baltimore, Md.; alleging that the article had been shipped in interstate commerce on or about June 4, 1938, by W. H. Martin from Bangor, Maine; and charging adulteration and misbranding in violation of the Food and Drugs Act. The article was labeled in part: "Maine Selected Potatoes Martin's W. H. M. Brand U. S. Commercial Graded \* \* \* W. H. Martin \* \* \* Bangor, Maine." The article was alleged to be adulterated in that it consisted in whole or in

part of a decomposed vegetable substance.

It was alleged to be misbranded in that the statement "U. S. Commercial" was false and misleading and tended to deceive and mislead the purchaser

when applied to potatoes below U. S. Commercial grade.

On June 28, 1938, W. H. Martin having appeared as claimant, the case came on for trial before the court. After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the court entered judgment for the claimant, with the following opinion delivered orally from the bench:

COLEMAN, District Judge: "I am inclined to believe that the owners of the goods in this shipment are entitled to a verdict in their favor, in view of the

conflict in the evidence in this case.

"Of course, it is difficult for the court to put itself in the position of the inspectors and attempt to say what yardstick ought to be adopted by the Government under this ruling. The fact remains, however, that the regulation with respect to the 6 percent tolerance is couched in very broad language and obviously permits of a great variation, depending upon how the examination is conducted.

"I do feel that there is considerable weight to the argument of the claimant that where 70 bags have been examined, as against 28, the former examination ought to control if there is nothing otherwise to upset it—in other words, if it appears to have been fairly and reasonably made. Of course, the person making it, the witness Schley, may be said to have an interest in the investigation because, presumably, he would have an interest in the sale. But, also, the Government witnesses who made the inspection had an interest in uphold-

ing the technical requirements of the law.

"Since the average of serious damage exceeds the allowable amount by relatively little—only three and a quarter percent, as I understand it, in regard to the 20 bags inspected for the claimant, and only one-quarter of a percent with reference to the inspection of 50 bags inspected for the claimant—I am inclined to take the position that this conflict, or wide variance between these figures and what the Government found—namely, an average of 15 percent with respect to the eight sacks seriously damaged, and an average of 13 percent with respect to the 20—I am inclined to the view that because of this difference between the two groups of inspections, it is very reasonable to say that a more minute inspection might have shown that the whole lot did not violate the regulations.

"I will, therefore, give the claimant the benefit of the doubt.

"Having come to that conclusion, it is equally reasonable to say that the goods should be allowed to go entirely free, because it necessarily follows that it cannot be said that they have been misbranded any more than it can be said that they are decomposed, contrary to law.

"I will sign a decree to this effect."

On June 29, 1938, a decree was entered dismissing the libel and ordering that the product be released to the claimant.